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The convention is that development studies cover
only the 'developing' countries of Africa, Asia and
Latin America, a sort of academic counterpart
of OXFAM. But this convention is ceasing to be
viable for European social scientists, and indeed
it is starting to be harmful. The assumption that
'their' problems are intrinsically different from
'ours' is not merely patronising; it has become a
hindrance to the transfer of experience. It is also
associated with political commitment of a sort
that hinders professional progress.
The extension of development studies to Europe
The artificiality of the distinction between 'devel-
oped' and 'developing' is perhaps most obvious
in Europe. Portugal, for example, has been a
member of OECD's Development Assistance
Committee, as well as the group of 'developed
market economies' at UNCTAD. Yet anyone
familiar with 'developing' countries, especially
in Latin America, finds the Portuguese scene
instantly recognisable (Bienefeld and Seers, 1976).
A similar structural dualism, with much lower
incomes, worse social conditions and higher
fertility in the (relatively large) population of the
rural areas. A similar concentration in the owner-
ship of property, especially land. A similar pattern
of trade, with tourist services, primary products
and textiles exchanged for arms, equipment, inter-
mediate products and sophisticated consumer
goods. A similar prevalence of transnational
corporations (TNCs) in secondary industry and
the services (especially big hotels). Similar
inappropriate technologies and associated chronic
unemployment, relieved (as in many 'developing'
countries especially in Central America and the
Caribbean) by large-scale migration abroad. A
not very different cultural dependence on foreign
styles of consumption and on imported ideologies,
fed by foreign firms, television programmes, etc.
The same sort of bureaucracy with a striking
combination of complacency and inefficiency.
Similar organised terrorism of both Right and
Left and similar political manipulation by domi-
nant powers.
Two basic politico-economic patterns characterise
'developing' countries. In one, a military dictator-
ship maintains a strong and stable currency by
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creating a favourable climate for foreign capital,
which implies suppressing trade union activity
and political opposition; in the other, a 'soft'
government is unable to resolve internal class
conflicts, the symptoms of its failure being chronic
inflation and foreign exchange difficulties, relieved
only by periodic devaluation.' Portugal has
demonstrated both patterns recentlythe former
before the 1974 coup, the latter after it. Such a
sudden and complete political somersault is also
itself characteristic.
Roughly similar socio-economic features and pat-
terns, including heavy dependence on labour
migration and tourism, can be seen in many coun-
tries of Southern EuropeSpain, Malta, Yugosla-
via, Greece, Cyprus and Turkeyand also in the
Irish Republic and Finland. So 'Third World'
experiencefor example in dealing with the
TNCsis likely to be relevant to their problems
too. Their social sciences would also gain from
an injection of the work of Latin American
theoristsas has indeed started to occur
(Guzman, 1976); this is likely to be more appro-
priate to such countries than neo-classical econo-
mics, or other theories imported from culturally
dominant countries.2
But if 'development studies' are to cover these
countries, why not Italy too? It shows many of
the same characteristics, notably a big economic
and social gap between the cities of the North
and the rural areas of the South (including Sicily
and Sardinia). It displays economic, cultural and
political dependence (including reliance on foreign
tourism and labour migration), though less than
in Portugal. Successive Italian governments have
also faced typical 'Latin American' problems of
chronic foreign exchange deficits and inflation,
especially since the 1973 rise in the price of oil.
And if Italy, why not Britain, the other econo-
mically 'weak' member of the EEC? It is true
that Britain isin contrast to most 'developing'
I There are of course hybrids, especially where (as in Argentins
and Chile) the structural causes of inflation are too deep-
seated to be eradicated by even ruthless military regimes.
2 IDS, in collaboration with CLACSO, is about to issue a
select bibliography of key Latin American writings on
deveolpmerit (with references to English and French trans-
lations where available).
countrieshighly industrialised and urbanised.
Although Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
are in some senses less developed than South-East
and Central England, regional economic inequali-
ties are mitigated by a powerful fiscal machine.
Poverty, even in the Highlands of Scotland,
is not comparable with what can be found in
Latin America or Portugal. Moreover, much of
industry is still British-owned. The country con-
tinues to be a generator as well as an importer
of capital, technology, arms, equipment and
cultural artefacts (such as television programmes).
It continues to absorb immigrant manpower of
various types (especially from the Irish Republic),
even if the net inflow is now negligible; and many
Britih tourists continue to visit the Continent,
although there is now a strong flow in the opposite
direction. Britain is, moreover, a country which
has been falling behind rather than failing to
catch up.
But the question is not the trivial quasi-joke
about whether Britain is a 'developing' country.
It is whether the insights gained in development
studies would be helpful to those working on
British problems, in view of its dependence on
foreign-based TNCs, and the difficulty its govern-
ment finds in reducing the pace of inflation, the
foreign exchange deficit and the level of unemploy-
ment (despite exceptional trade union cooperation
and mounting revenues from North Sea gas and
oil) (M Phil faculty and students, 1977).
Typical symptoms of dependence are the tendency
to await an acceleration of economic growth
in the United States as the solution to national
economic problems, a reliance on TNCs for new
investment bringing modern technologyas in
the North Sea oilfieldsand the publicity given
to arrivals of IMF missions. (It is rather curious,
even dispiriting, to hear in Britain now the same
old arguments for and against 'monetarist' policies
which have dominated Latin American economic
controversy for the last quarter-century. British
politicians are apparently, like British economists,
too parochial even to be aware of them.)
Development studies have made us familiar with
the core-periphery concept: Western Europe seems
to have its own core and periphery. What is more,
there is a definite geographical pattern to it, with
the European periphery3 forming a ring around
the core, whether defined in terms of countries
or of regions cutting across national boundaries
3 This concept will be explored more fully in later work.
(including in the core, for example, Northern
Italy and most of England).
This raises a number of intriguing questions. How
is this European pattern related to the dependence
of the whole of Western Europe on the United
States? To what extent can we see a similar
pattern in Eastern Europe? If so, is the core East
Germany? In that case, can we speak of a con-
tinental dependence system (a 'new order'?) in
Europe based on Germany, West and East? Does
this suggest an eventual integration of Eastern
and Western Europe? Or is the whole of Eastern
Europe too heavily dependent on the Soviet
Union?
Insights acquired from work in the development
field would throw light on several European
policy issues, including those raised by the en-
largement of the EEC. For example, anyone who
has worked on industrial or agricultural policy
overseas will know that a simplistic cost-benefit
analysis based on internal rates of return for
individual projects such as EEC financial agencies
use (Bienefeld and Seers, 1976), will be far from
suitable for evaluating sectoral or local pro-
grammes with objectives that include reducing
unemployment and inequality. (Aid agencies such
as 0DM might well turn their attention and at
least a small part of their resources to such
problems: they should certainly be involved in
negotiations on enlargement.)
This extension of development studies also has
interesting implications for 'North-South' negotia-
tions, if certain countries of Europe, includiig
Britain, and the Third World share problems
with common causes, then is there not a basis
for much greater cooperation in international
fora, such as UNCTAD, on many issues for
example monitoring the TNCs? And might not
European governments benefit from technical
assistance from agencies with international ex-
perience in problems like structural unemployment
(e.g. the ILO)?
This geographical extension of development
studies would not merely contribute to a deeper
understanding of European problems, but also
conversely throw light on the problems of the
countries conventionally covered by development
studies. The ring-like periphery of Europe prompts
us to reflect on the wider significance of spatial
analysis, and to look for similar patterns in other
areas: the Northern half of the Western Hemi-
sphere, Southern Africa and the South Pacific
spring to mind. This would be a refinement on the
somewhat global core-periphery analysis current
in development studies.
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Political expedience and development studies
What stops the inclusion of the European peri-
phery in development studies? It is the conven-
tion under which the field deals with aided coun-
tries. The origins of its current definitions lie in
political expendiency allied to commercialism,
humanitarianism and academic territorialism----a
powerful and somewhat unholy alliance.
As the Cold War intensified in the l950s and
former colonies became independent, political
attention in the metropolitan countries focused on
problems of 'underdevelopment', which were seen
as potential breeding grounds for communism.
When three groupings emerged in the politics of
international organisationsthe 'developed' coun-
tries with high per ca pita incomes, the 'centrally
planned', and the large residual category of the
'developing'the last was treated as qualitatively
different and alone in need of support from aid
agencies and development economists.
This tripartite division of the world was of course
both novel and highly artificial. But, as I have
pointed out earlier (Seers, 1976), it did have some
basis in reality. It recognised the common prob-
lems and interests of the governments of 'devel-
oping' countries vis à vis the companies and
governments of richer countries) and their com-
mon historic resentments. The governments in
the 'developed' countries were prepared to institute
aid programmes designed, inter alia, to keep those
outside the communist bloc still 'developing'. Yet
it allowed the bureaucratic class in the communist
countries to consider governments of various
political complexions as anti-imperialist, and to
lend them diplomatic support while leaving to the
imperial powers themselves the responsibility
for financial and technical aid.
Soon the three world classification acquired a life
of its own. Typically, the governing councils of
international agencies have balanced representa-
tion between 'centrally-planned', 'developed' and
'developing' countries, and so have their commit-
tees, expert groups, missions, etc. Many govern-
ments of 'developing' countries have come to
consider 'Third World unity' a major source of
strength. All sorts of institutions have grown up
to facilitate 'South-South' and 'North-South'
discussions and negotiations.
Academic work in 'developed' countries on the
problems of the 'developing' countries was also
influenced; though it had started much earlier,
especially in the fields of anthropolgy and colonial
economies. When aid departments and the United
Nations agencies and regional commissions were
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established, in response to the various political
interests mentioned above, much greater oppor-
tunities were provided for both field and desk
research on 'developing' countries. Special devel-
opment institutions such as IDS were also set up.
Those engaged in research in this field have
accepted the geographical definition used by its
sponsors.4 Moreover, one is bound to say that
some of it has not been as objective as is perhaps
customary in the social sciences. There has been
an implicit assumption that the ultimate goals
would be European-style political institutions and
levels of living within a capitalist systembasically
the same goals as those of colonial governments.
Many researchers in colonial times and subse-
quently have also assumed (usually tacitly) that
those with political power were sufficiently moti-
vated and efficient to achieve these ends, and that
they could and would make good use of technical
and financial assistance. This has amounted to a
new (though very different) 'trahaison des clercs'.
Elaborate models were worked out to help policy-
makers accelerate economic growth and (when
political concerns changed) to deal with problems
such as high-level manpower shortages, unem-
ployment, inequality and poverty. Development
research in all these areas has been marked by
conceptual imprecision and a very casual use of
statisticsas was inevitable if 'results' were to be
provided for policy-makers, but primary data
were meagre or non-existent.
Several development courses were established in
Europe. These were more or less explicitly
designed to 'train' people how to run their own
countries (often being succesors to colonial service
courses), though they sometimes also had places
for those from 'developed' countries who were
primarily interested in the problems of the 'Third
World'.
Many European academics have also been heavily
involved in advisory work on 'development'.
These have often done little or no similar work
on the problems of their own countries. The very
understandable desire to do something about the
4 The idea of treating European countries as cases for develop-
ment is not, however, really at all novel. Development
studies were born in Europe. I am not referring to the
work of Adam Smith or Karl Marx or even the industrial-
isation debate in the Soviet Union in the 1920s: the first
two development studies in the modern sense were written
by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Martin, né Mandelbaum(1947). They dealt with the post-war development needs of
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. These were followed
by werk on the Italian South by Rosenstein-Rodan, Chenery
and others. This work on Europe was, however, submerged
in the swelling torrent of research on Africa, Asia and
Latin America.
poverty of the rural masses in the tropics has
been reinforced by rather flattering invitations to
propose solutions to their problems.
Inevitably, much of this work has been super-
ficial. We economists in particular have often
offered advice without much knowledge of the
history or the political context of the country con-
cerned and therefore with little basis for framing
the questions to be studied, let alone predicting
the results of our advice. In fact, we have rarely
known or even enquired what political interests
our visits have served (and often the real motive
of an invitation has been to obtain our signatures
rather than our opinions). The actual outcome of
such well-meaning intervention has sometimes
been inadvertently to strengthen regimes obstruct-
ing the very changes we have advocatedwhich
may of course sometimes have been the intention
all along of the donor agencies sponsoring our
travels. Indeed, there is now a fairly widespread
disillusion about the effectiveness of high-level
technical assistance in the face of powerful
hostility to social change or indifference.
Events in recent years, especially the 'oil crisis'
and the subsequent recession, have made the
three-world classification much less realistic. As
explained above, some European countries have
developed 'Latin American' symptoms: indeed,
few of them are acceptable any longer as models
to the rest of the world nor do their governments
have the resourcesgiven their domestic prob-
lemsto sustain big aid programmes or paternal-
istic roles. Communist countries have also devel-
oped unevenly and no longer form such a homo-
geneous group with respect to either institutions
or policy. The growing detente between their
governments and those of capitalist countries
raises basic questions about the rationale of a
world classification that originated in the Cold
War. Enormous differences in politico-economic
power have also appeared within the Third World.
The per capita incomes of most oil exporters and
of some other countriesto take the common
yardstick on the conventional approachnow
exceed those of some European countries (indeed
Kuwait has the highest per capita income in the
world), and what is more to the point, their
governments have essential products to sell and
capital to invest.
One can perhaps see parallels with the blurring of
class divisions inside European countries, where
sections of the working class have achieved a
bargaining strength and income levels higher than
many of those conventionally considered 'middle
class' (and labour studies have been extended
beyond their traditional field, the manual
workers).
The oil crisis not merely undermined the
old three-world classification, and demonstrated
that there were other ways of obtaining capital
than waiting for aid, it threw doubt on the
basically optimictic assumptions that underlay
much of the research and advice in this field.
Limits to oil and other non-renewable resources
have raised serious doubts whether all the
countries of the world will become 'developed'
even in the remote future, and their populations
as a whole able to afford cars and other elements
in the level of living of the European working
class. While we are not entering a 'zero sum'
game, the sum no longer seems infinite.
International relations are characterised by a
new ruthlessness, and the position of many
'developed' countries, especially those dependent
on imported oil, has become precarious. As
happened inside the industrial countries them-
selves, the representatives of the poor are not wait-
ing any more for charitable concessions, but
starting to organise to extract what they can.
The quandary of the European academic
What is the European social scientist to do?
Certainly some will continue to carry out research,
training and consultancy exclusively on behalf of
'developing' countries and much of this has no
doubt a certain value. Often the underlying
assumption is that it is desirable to redistribute
income towards these countries, however, the
idea of a European devoting his energies to shift-
ing resources to foreign governments now seems
rather anomalous, especially if they go to support
and strengthen the bureaucracy. Yet advocacy of
redistribution inside other countries raises un-
comfortable questions about paternalism and the
propriety of urging sacrifices on other bourgeois,
quite apart from the very doubtful effectiveness
of such advice. Analogous questions are raised
even more sharply for those whose work implies
the need for others to carry out revolutions.
This complex of intellectual and moral uncer-
tainties recalls the doubts that troubled the Euro-
pean intelligentsia in the Reformation. The reality
is that there is very little we can do as either
officials or academics to improve social conditions
in other continentsalthough we can perhaps
make them worse! It is not surprising that some
European social scientists who had specialised in
development have been leaving the field. For
those who remain, the first step in changing our
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role is to acknowledge the obvious social and
political problems in our own country; the second
is to accept the validity and utility of nationalism
as a shield against dependence; and the third to
re&lise that transfers of resources to countries
which are poorer may well, given the extent of
our own problems and the difficulties of reaching
those in real need, not increase net welfare.
For some, the next step after this is to search for
interface policies that will reconcile the needs of
those in developed and developing countries.
Others see their task as exploringin alliance
with the ecologistswhat changes in lifestyles
in developed countries would relieve the pressure
on oil and other scarce resources, thus creating
greater economic space for satisfying basic needs
in poorer countries. I will not go into detail here
on the pros and cons of these new approaches.
They are certainly much healthier than the old
concern with the policies of foreign governments.
But they raise big questions of political feasibility
and do not entirely avoid the invidious task of
defining other people's needs.
Perhaps some European social scientists need to
draw more far-reaching conclusions. The kernel
of development studies will surely become the
concentration of economic and political power,
and the consequent creation of poverty, both
absolute and relative, wherever this occurs, notjust in the so-called Third World, but also in
Europe. This process of marginalisation is not
purely economic: it includes threats to national,
regional or ethnic identity. Its study involves
analysis of the institutions, especially international
which in various ways transmit the techniques,
tastes, theories and ideologies that generate in-
equalityincluding inequalities between and
within European countries.
Explaining its causal dynamics leads into deeper
historical, as well as broader geographical, analy-
sis than has been customary in our field so far.
lt means investigating the origins of the present
world structure, especially the creation and dis-
olution of the colonial system, which was of
course based in Europe, and drawing on all parts
of the world for case studies in teaching as well
as research.
The professionalisation of development studies
will be helped by their extension to European
countries and vice versa. Besides providing fresh
insights into iiational and regional problems in
Europe, the application of development analysis
there will make obsolete, at least in academic
work, the professionally dubious distinction
between 'developed' and 'developing' countries,
lo
the models and the emulators.5 Conversely, it is
difficult to extend development studies to Europe
until we have discarded a classification of coun-
tries which originated primarily in political
expediency.
That there are strongly entrenched vested interests
against this change of emphasis is implicit in the
foregoing analysis. To abandon the 'Third World'
as a category, and give up using the phrase itself,
would dilute the political cement holding together
a coalition which has become even more useful to
the governments of the countries concerned.
'North-South' negotiations would lose their
rationale:6 indeed both 'North' and 'South' would
disappear as concepts (though of course the basic
issues of commodity and energy policy and so
forth would still need to be discussed).
The new approach threatens the political con-
stituency of the bilateral aid administrator, based
on transnational corporations and voluntary
agencies, and seems heartless to those whose
main concern is humanitarian. Some on the West
European Left would find it hard to accept the
validity of their own country's interests. Officials
in Communist countries would be very suspicious
of their own internal problems being put in this
framework. Any European government (West or
East) would find it hard to cooperate politically
with governments of 'developing' countries or to
apply for technical assistance, in part because of
the residues of paternalism. Fundamental changes
would be needed in the structures and procedures
of international agencies and national administra-
tions.
A heavy cost would also be borne by academics
themselves: research covering exclusively 'devel-
oping' (or, for that matter, exclusively 'developed')
countries would quickly become obsolete, lecture
I am sometimes asked how I reconcile my present position
with my criticisms in the early l960s of the naive transfer
of economic theories developed in Europe and North
America to countries in other continents with quite different
institutions_e.g. in my 'The Limitations of the Special Case'(originally published in Bulletin, Oxford Institute of Econ-
omics and Statistics, 1962). In the first place, that battlehas partly been won: social science syllabuses of universities
in other continents are no longer modelled so closely on
those of Eurpe and North America. But, in addition, the
changes outlined above in the international scene have
created conditions in which it is more constructive now to
emphasise the common elements of problems. Besides, I
was then arguing against transferring theories devised for
the 'developed' countries to the Third World. I am now
advocating a transfer in the reverse direction: it seems that
the theories devised for the 'developed' countries (such as
Keynesian and other forms of nro-classical economics) are
ceasing to be appropriate even in the countries where they
originated.
6 The North-South 'dialogue' reflects the seating arrangements
in the British House of Commons, where the parties con-
front each other: one might view the world political structure
as more like the continuous arc of the French Chamber.
notes in the field of development studies might
have to be torn up, reading lists substantially
revised and inventories of textbooks written off.
Libraries would need to be reorganised and their
purchasing policies broadened. Training courses
(if 'training' is the right word in this field) would
have to include European material, and to aim
at the enrolment of students from Europe who
are working on European problems and of
teachers from other continents. Offers of con-
sultancies would be treated much more warily.
Development studies as redefined above would
no doubt remain a separate field characterised
by interdisciplinarity, an historical approach, an
emphasis on international determinants and a
focus on institutional issues. lt would still be
marked by greater concern for social problems,
particularly poverty, than is customary among
academic social scientists, and greater need for
the first-hand acquaintance with these 'problems
that can only be provided by fieldwork (though
of a less paternalistic kind). But the boundaries
dividing it from the conventional social sciences
would be hazier and easier to violate. Those in
development institutes would have to familiarise
themselves with work on their own country and
also face the 'rigorous' standards of their col-
leagues in disciplinary departments. The latter
on the other hand would hardly feel comfortable
in closer contact with the messy and largely
unquantifiable problems of the real world.
lt will therefore take quite some time for devel-
opment studies to escape from their traditional
boundaries. From the viewpoint of the European
academic, however, there would be major benefits
to offset against the short-term costs of its re-
definition. Awkward moral tensions would be
eased. Challenging possibilities would be opened
up for more objective and fundamental research,
based (to the extent that quantitative analysis is
possible) on proper statistics. We would be less
at the mercy of changes in political winds. Our
own social science syllabuses could be made more
relevant to our own continental, national and
regional problems. In addition, European social
scientists could become genuine colleagues of
those in other continentssomething hardly
possible so long as development studies exclude
Europe.
We are brought back therefore to the old-
fashioned conclusion that academics had best use
long spoons when supping with politicians. Their
immunity from political pressures has been de-
fended on the ground that it was necessary for
innovative professional work. In development
studies, this defence has been imparied. I am not,
however, suggesting that the subject's social
relevance should be reduced; rather that those
inside government or outside should be left to
draw whatever conclusions are relevant to their
own occupation, nationality and ideology. The
study of the constraints on national policy is
potentially significant for people of many types,
inside or outside government. Politicians and
officials may well take more notice of the con-
tributions of academics who are less partisan,
and therefore more readily reconsider the assump-
tions on which their aproaches are based.
But that would be so-to-speak a by-product. A
mofe important result of some degree of detach-
ment of development studies from the aid lobby is
that this would facilitate the coverage of
European problems. While it can be argued
plausibly (if perhaps mistakenly) that development
theory and experience, as conventionally defined,
can contribute little to the analysis of the prob-
lems of countries such as the United States and
the Soviet Union, this is obviously untrue of
Portugal and other countries in the European
periphery. They provide the bridge for the ex-
tension and thus professionalisation of develop-
ment studies.
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